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MATTHEW BROD* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine the following hypothetical situation: a man (“Walter”) in 
his early sixties works as a sales representative for a pharmaceutical 
company. Unfortunately, Walter is inefficient, frequently late when 
completing reports, unprepared for meetings, short with customers, 
and disruptive at his workplace. After countless opportunities to 
correct his behavior, the pharmaceutical company fires Walter for 
unsatisfactory work performance. His employer (“Employer”), 
however, has an additional reason for his termination: Walter’s 
supervisor believes that Plaintiff is too old for the job. Soon after 
being fired, Walter sues Employer arguing that he was fired because 
of his age. 
On these facts, Walter has a mixed-motive1 discrimination claim. 
But there is a catch: Walter cannot offer direct evidence2 of 
discrimination. He never heard the Employer’s admission that he was 
fired due to his age. Rather, Walter can point only to circumstantial 
evidence3—disparaging comments, unpleasant reassignments, and 
instances of social exclusion—from which a trier of fact could infer 
 
 *  2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law. 
 1. Mixed-motive refers to cases in which an adverse employment decision results from 
“multiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 
228, 260 (1989) (White, J., concurring). 
 2. “Evidence that is based on personal knowledge or observation and that, if true, proves 
a fact without inference or presumption.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 596 (8th ed. 2007). 
 3. “Evidence based on inference and not on personal knowledge or observation.” Id. at 
595. 
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age-based discrimination. The question thus arises whether Walter can 
bring a mixed-motive suit against Employer without presenting direct 
evidence of discrimination? The answer to this question turns upon 
whether amendments to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”) also apply to other federal anti-discrimination statutes. 
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) prohibits 
an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual with 
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual’s age.”4 On May 14, 2008, the 
Eighth Circuit decided that in mixed-motive cases arising under the 
ADEA, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant “only upon a 
demonstration by direct evidence that an illegitimate factor played a 
substantial role in an adverse employment decision.”5  
On December 5, 2008, the United States Supreme Court granted a 
writ of certiorari6 to review the Eighth Circuit’s holding that the 
plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in order to 
obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination 
case.7 The implications of the case are clear. A direct evidence 
requirement would preclude all non-Title VII plaintiffs from 
obtaining a mixed-motive instruction where only circumstantial 
evidence of discrimination is available. 
II.  FACTS 
Although Walter is a hypothetical employee used to exemplify 
mixed-motive age-discrimination claims, Jack Gross is a real man, who 
was really fired potentially due, in part, to his age.  
Gross was born in 1948.8 He began working at FBL Financial 
Group (“FBL”) in 1987 and received promotions in 1990, 1993, 1997, 
and 1999.9 In 2001, during a company reorganization, FBL reassigned 
Gross from the position of Claims Administration Vice President to 
 
 4. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623(a)(1) (West 2009). To state a valid disparate treatment claim under 
the ADEA, a plaintiff must prove that his or her age “actually played a role in [the employer’s 
decision-making] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome.” Hazen Paper Co. 
v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993). The ADEA applies only to individuals who are at least 
forty years of age. 29 U.S.C.A. § 631(a) (West 2009). 
 5. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 6. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 680 (2008) (mem.). 
 7. Brief for Petitioner at i, Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 08-441 (U.S. Jan. 26, 2009). 
 8. Gross, 526 F.3d at 358. 
 9. Id. 
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Claims Administrator Director.10 Although Gross’s job responsibilities 
did not change, Gross viewed the reassignment as a demotion because 
it reduced his salary.11 In 2003, at the age of fifty-four, FBL reassigned 
Gross yet again, this time to the position of Claims Project 
Coordinator.12 FBL transferred many of Gross’s former 
responsibilities to the Claims Administration Manager—a position 
held by Lisa Kneeskern, an employee in her early forties.13 Although 
Gross’s new position was paid the same salary as Kneeskern’s 
position, Gross viewed the reassignment as a demotion “because 
Kneeskern assumed the functional equivalent of Gross’s former 
position, and his new position was ill-defined and lacked a job 
description or specifically-assigned duties.”14 
In April 2004, Gross sued FBL alleging that FBL violated the 
ADEA by demoting him because of his age.15 During the trial, the 
district court instructed the jury that Gross had the burden to prove 
that (1) FBL demoted Gross and (2) Gross’s age was a motivating 
factor in FBL’s decision to demote him.16 The court noted, however, 
that the jury must find in favor of FBL if FBL proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have demoted Gross 
notwithstanding his age.17 The district court overruled FBL’s 
objections to these instructions, and the jury found in favor of Gross 
and awarded him $46,945 in lost compensation.18 FBL appealed and 
argued to the Eighth Circuit Court that the district court’s mixed-
motive instruction was erroneous.19  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and 
remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the final jury 
instruction improperly shifted the burden of persuasion to FBL by 
allowing Gross to obtain a mixed-motive instruction without 
presenting direct evidence of discrimination.20 
 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 360 (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 358. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 362. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court set out 
a tripartite burden-shifting framework for claims of discrimination 
arising under Title VII.21  
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.22 The plaintiff may do this by showing: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, 
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s 
qualifications.23 
Second, the defendant has the burden of production to put into 
evidence a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the allegedly 
discriminatory termination or demotion.24 If the defendant produces a 
legitimate reason, the presumption of discrimination disappears.25  
Finally, the plaintiff has the opportunity to prove that the 
supposed reason for the employment decision was in fact a pretext for 
discrimination.26  
Because the ADEA, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 
Title VII retaliation claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Family and 
Medical Leave Act (FMLA) contain language analogous to language 
found in Title VII, the Supreme Court has assumed that the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies to claims of 
discrimination under these related statutes.27 
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court established an 
affirmative defense for employers in mixed-motive cases but also 
generated tremendous uncertainty as to the kind of evidence required 
 
 21. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 22. Id. at 802. 
 23. Id. The Court explained, however, that the elements of a prima facie case depend on 
the factual circumstances of a case. Id. at 802 n.13. 
 24. Id. at 802. 
 25. Id. at 803. 
 26. Id. at 804. 
 27. See, e.g., Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 45 (2003) (applying the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to an ADA claim); O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 
311 (1996) (assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ADEA suits); St. 
Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 n.1 (1993) (assuming that the McDonnell 
Douglas framework applies to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims). 
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to obtain a mixed-motive instruction. In that case, the partners in 
Price Waterhouse’s accounting firm refused to re-propose Ann 
Hopkins for partnership after they had postponed the decision the 
previous year.28 Although Hopkins was “sometimes overly aggressive, 
unduly harsh, difficult to work with and impatient with staff,”29 the 
Price Waterhouse partners also criticized her because she was a 
woman.30 Indeed, a partner told Hopkins that, in order to improve her 
chances of making partner, she should “walk more femininely, talk 
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair 
styled, and wear jewelry.”31 Thus, the partners had both legitimate 
concerns about Hopkins’s interpersonal skills and “an impermissibly 
cabined view of the proper behavior of women.”32 
In a fractured opinion, the Supreme Court held that a defendant-
employer may completely avoid liability by proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same 
employment decision regardless of the plaintiff’s protected trait.33 A 
majority of the Justices, however, disagreed on the kind of evidence 
required for a plaintiff to obtain a mixed-motive instruction. Writing 
for a plurality of four Justices, Justice Brennan stated that a plaintiff 
must prove that her protected trait was a motivating factor in an 
employment decision;34 Justice Brennan did not, however, “suggest a 
limitation on the possible ways of proving that stereotyping played a 
motivating role in an employment decision.”35 Justice White, 
concurring in the judgment, believed that the Court’s decision in Mt. 
Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle36 governed 
the case and, therefore, that the burden shifts to the defendant only 
when a plaintiff “show[s] that the unlawful motive was a substantial 
factor in the adverse employment action.”37 
Justice O’Connor, however, announced a new evidentiary 
standard in her concurring opinion. In order to shift the burden of 
 
 28. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality 
opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 
(1991) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 29. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1113 (D.D.C. 1985). 
 30. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 236–37. 
 33. Id. at 258; id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 34. Id. at 258 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 35. Id. at 251–52. 
 36. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). 
 37. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring). 
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persuasion to the defendant, Justice O’Connor stated, a plaintiff must 
show “by direct evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a 
substantial factor in the decision.”38 This showing triggers “the 
deterrent purpose of the statute”39 and allows a finder of fact to 
“conclude that absent further explanation, the employer’s 
discriminatory motivation ‘caused’ the employment decision.”40 
Although Justice O’Connor did not define “direct evidence,” she 
noted that it does not extend to “statements by nondecisionmakers,  
. . . statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process 
itself,” or “stray remarks in the workplace.”41 
After Price Waterhouse, most lower courts42 treated Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion as controlling because it appeared to 
represent the narrowest rationale for the Court’s decision.43 In fact, 
Justice Kennedy prefaced his dissenting opinion in Price Waterhouse, 
in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia joined, by stating 
that the Court’s holding requires a Title VII plaintiff to present “direct 
and substantial evidence of discriminatory animus” in order to shift 
the burden of persuasion to the defendant in mixed-motive cases.44 
The Supreme Court has since declined to address whether Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion establishes binding precedent.45 Justice Ginsburg, 
however, has expressed concern with the position taken by most 
lower courts, stating that to infer a direct evidence requirement from 
 
 38. Id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In Justice O’Connor’s view, Hopkins presented 
direct evidence of discrimination. “As the decisionmakers exited the room, she was told by one 
of those privy to the decisionmaking process that her gender was a major reason for the 
rejection of her partnership bid.” Id. at 273. 
 42. See Weston-Smith v. Cooley Dickinson Hosp., Inc., 282 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2002) 
(noting that Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence rule is one of “two different models for analysis 
of employment discrimination cases”). But see Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 
1183 (2d Cir. 1992) (“‘[D]irect evidence’ was not a requirement imposed by the majority in Price 
Waterhouse.”). 
 43. See City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988) (“[W]hen 
no single rationale commands a majority, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as that 
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds.’”) 
(quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 44. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 45. See Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (“Like the Court of Appeals, we 
see no need to address which of the opinions in Price Waterhouse is controlling: the third step of 
petitioner’s argument is flawed, primarily because it is inconsistent with the text of 42 U.S.C.A. 
§ 2000e-2(m).”). 
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Price Waterhouse is “a lot to load on two words in a concurring 
opinion.”46 
Two years after Price Waterhouse, in 1991, Congress amended Title 
VII to prove additional remedies for acts of intentional discrimination 
in the workplace.47 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 (“1991 Act”) 
responded to Price Waterhouse in two ways.48 First, the 1991 Act 
amended section 703 by adding subsection (m), which provides that 
“an unlawful employment practice is established when the 
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, 
even though other factors also motivated the practice.”49 Second, the 
1991 Act amended section 706(g) by adding subparagraph (B), which 
retained the “same-decision defense”—i.e., an allegedly 
discriminatory decision is permissible if the same decision would have 
occurred due to a legitimate consideration—as a limitation on a 
plaintiff’s remedies in mixed-motive cases.50 But even if an employer 
demonstrates that it would have taken the same employment action 
absent an impermissible motive, the court may award the plaintiff 
declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorney’s fees and costs, 
but not damages, reinstatement, hiring, or a promotion.51 
Following this amendment, the main issue was “whether a plaintiff 
[was required to] present direct evidence of discrimination in order to 
obtain a mixed-motive instruction under Title VII . . . as amended by 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”52 In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, Justice 
Thomas, writing for a unanimous Court, held that a Title VII plaintiff 
need not present direct evidence of discrimination in order to obtain 
a mixed-motive instruction.53  
 
 46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90 (No. 02-679). 
 47. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In addition, Congress amended Title VII “to codify the 
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards 
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)” as well as “to confirm statutory authority and 
provide statutory guidelines for the adjudication of disparate impact suits under Title VII.” Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. 
 48. Civil Rights Act of 1991. 
 49. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
 50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i–ii) (West 2009). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003). 
 53. Id. at 101–02. 
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The Court advanced four reasons in support of its decision. First, 
section 2000e-2(m) of the 1991 Act “does not mention, much less 
require, that a plaintiff make a heightened showing through direct 
evidence.”54 Second, Congress had defined “demonstrates” in the 1991 
Act as meeting “the burdens of production and persuasion.”55 The 
Court reasoned that had Congress wanted to impose a heightened 
proof requirement, it could have explicitly stated that it intended to 
require direct evidence.56 Third, absent an affirmative directive from 
Congress, the Court refused to depart from the conventional rule of 
civil litigation that a plaintiff may prove her case using either direct or 
circumstantial evidence.57 According to the Court, “The reason for 
treating circumstantial and direct evidence alike is both clear and 
deep rooted: ‘Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may 
also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct 
evidence.’”58 Indeed, direct evidence is often difficult to obtain in 
employment discrimination cases because “[t]here will seldom be 
‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental processes.”59 
Finally, the use of the term “demonstrates” in other provisions of Title 
VII shows that section 2000e-2(m) does not require direct evidence.60 
Under § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), for instance, a plaintiff is entitled to limited 
remedies if the defendant “demonstrates that [it] would have taken 
the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating 
factor.”61 The Court found that this related provision does not require 
a showing of direct evidence.62 Thus, after Desert Palace, a Title VII 
plaintiff may present either circumstantial or direct evidence that an 
illegitimate criterion was a motivating factor in an adverse 
employment action. 
The Court’s decision in Desert Palace is based on the 1991 Act, 
which amended Title VII. The 1991 Act, however, did not explicitly 
amend the ADEA, ADA, Title VII retaliation claims, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 
 
 54. Id. at 98–99. 
 55. Id. at 99. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 100 (quoting Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)). For 
instance, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods, Inc., the Court allowed a plaintiff to use 
circumstantial evidence to impugn an employer’s reason for an alleged discriminatory practice. 
530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). 
 59. U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983). 
 60. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100. 
 61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (West 2009) (emphasis added). 
 62. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 101. 
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or the FMLA. In the wake of Desert Palace, a split emerged among 
the circuits as to the kind of evidence required in non-Title VII 
mixed-motive cases. While the Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth 
Circuits, as well as the District of Columbia,63 have not required direct 
evidence in mixed-motive claims arising under the federal anti-
discrimination statutes, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth and 
Eighth Circuits64 have taken the contrary view. 
IV.  HOLDING 
Finding the 1991 Act inapposite, the Eighth Circuit in Gross v. 
FBL Financial Services, Inc. applied the evidentiary standard 
announced in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The Eighth Circuit held that in mixed-motive 
cases arising under the ADEA, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 
defendant “only upon a demonstration by direct evidence that an 
illegitimate factor played a substantial role in an adverse employment 
decision.”65 Because Gross conceded that he did not present direct 
evidence of discrimination, the Eighth Circuit found that Gross could 
not obtain a mixed-motive instruction and, therefore, that the 
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green burden-shifting framework 
governed the case.66 Thus, the Eighth Circuit stated, “[T]he jury should 
 
 63. See, e.g., Reilly v. TXU Corp., 271 F. App’x. 375, 380 (5th Cir. 2008) (noting that direct 
evidence is not required in mixed-motive cases arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Faas v. Sears, 
Roebuck & Co., 532 F.3d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that to bring an ADEA claim under 
a mixed-motive analysis, a plaintiff must prove discrimination by direct proof, which can be 
satisfied by either circumstantial or direct evidence); Fye v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 
1217, 1226 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that a plaintiff can establish retaliation under Price 
Waterhouse through direct or circumstantial evidence); Sellie v. Boeing Co., 253 F. App’x 626, 
627 n.2 (9th Cir. 2007) (assuming, without deciding, that Desert Palace and the 1991 Act apply to 
the ADEA); Thomas v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 131 F.3d 198, 203–04 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (noting that even if Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse 
establishes binding precedent, it does not disqualify circumstantial evidence). 
 64. See, e.g., Rios-Jimenez v. Principi, 520 F.3d 31, 39 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that a plaintiff 
must offer direct evidence of discrimination under a mixed-motive analysis); Baqir v. Principi, 
434 F.3d 733, 745 n.13 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that since Congress did not amend the ADEA, 
Price Waterhouse continues to apply to ADEA cases); Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 
181, 187 (2d Cir. 2006) (noting that since the plaintiff did not present direct evidence of age 
discrimination, his case is governed by McDonnell Douglas); Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp., 
391 F.3d 506, 512 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that direct evidence is required under the ADEA in 
mixed-motive cases); Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 571 (6th Cir. 2003) 
(finding Price Waterhouse inapplicable where the plaintiff failed to present direct evidence of 
discrimination). 
 65. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 360 (8th Cir. 2008). 
 66. Id. 
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have been charged to decide whether [Gross] proved that age was the 
determining factor in FBL’s employment action.”67 
Gross argued that the 1991 Act and the Court’s subsequent 
holding in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa superseded Justice O’Connor’s 
direct evidence rule in Price Waterhouse with respect to ADEA 
claims.68 The Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the 1991 Act 
repudiated the direct evidence requirement for claims arising under 
Title VII, but determined that the 1991 Act did not apply to ADEA 
claims.69 In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit first relied on a 
textual interpretation of the 1991 Act. Section 2000e-2(m) applies 
only to cases in which race, color, religion, sex, or national origin is a 
motivating factor in an adverse employment action.70 Thus, because 
section 2000e-2(m) does not include adverse employment actions 
taken due to an employee’s age, Price Waterhouse continues to apply 
to mixed-motive cases arising under the ADEA.71 
In reaching its decision, the Eighth Circuit distinguished a Fifth 
Circuit case taking the contrary view. In Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 
Ahmed Rachid sued his employer under the ADEA, alleging that he 
was terminated from his managerial position because of his age.72 Jack 
in the Box contended that Rachid violated company policy by failing 
to properly record employee time; however, Rachid’s supervisor 
regularly criticized Rachid and made belittling comments about his 
age.73 In that case, the Fifth Circuit held that direct evidence of 
discrimination is not required to obtain a mixed-motive instruction 
for claims arising under the ADEA.74 Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit 
called into question the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning, noting that Rachid 
involved a motion for summary judgment while Desert Palace 
concerned jury instructions after trial.75 
Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit stated that Desert Palace did not 
modify a mixed-motive analysis under the ADEA because Desert 
 
 67. Id. at 360. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 360–61. 
 70. Id. at 361. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 307 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 311. 
 75. Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 n.2 (8th Cir. 2008). The Eighth Circuit 
has consistently held that Desert Palace does not apply on motions for summary judgment. 
Carraher v. Target Corp., 503 F.3d 714, 716 n.3 (8th Cir. 2007). 
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Palace dealt only with the effects of the 1991 Act.76 The Eighth Circuit 
acknowledged that “some of the analysis in Desert Palace may seem 
inconsistent with the controlling rule from Price Waterhouse”77 but 
found that Desert Palace did not “speak directly to the vitality of the 
previous decision, and it continues to be controlling where 
applicable.”78 The Eighth Circuit concluded, therefore, that the direct 
evidence rule set out in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in 
Price Waterhouse continues to apply to mixed-motive cases arising 
under the ADEA.79 Applying the direct evidence rule to the facts of 
Gross, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court’s final jury 
instruction was erroneous.80 
V.  ANALYSIS 
A. The Eighth Circuit’s Decision 
The Eighth Circuit’s holding in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 
Inc. that a plaintiff must present direct evidence of discrimination in 
order to shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant in mixed-
motive cases arising under the ADEA rests on two justifications. 
The first justification—that section 2000e-2(m) of the 1991 Act 
applies only to cases in which race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin is a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision—is a 
straightforward textual interpretation of the 1991 Act. Because 
Congress amended Title VII but did not explicitly amend the ADEA, 
the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins rule continues to apply to mixed-
motive cases arising under the ADEA. Nevertheless, the legislative 
history of the 1991 Act undermines this conclusion. The House 
Report states: 
The Committee intends that . . . other laws modeled after  
Title VII [, including the ADA and the ADEA, should] be 
interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as 
amended by this Act. For example, disparate impact claims under 
the ADA should be treated in the same manner as under Title 
VII.81 
 
 76. Gross, 526 F.3d at 362. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. 
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This language suggests that courts should apply the “motivating 
factor” standard set forth in the 1991 Act to mixed-motive cases 
arising under the ADEA.82 
The second justification—that Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa did not 
modify a mixed-motive analysis under the ADEA because it dealt 
only with the effects of the 1991 Act on jury instructions in mixed-
motive cases—is not entirely persuasive. In Desert Palace, the Court’s 
decision was based, in part, on the relationship between Title VII and 
the 1991 Act. But Desert Palace also rested on a rationale 
independent of the 1991 Act—namely that the conventional rule of 
civil litigation permitting a plaintiff to prove her case using either 
direct or circumstantial evidence is generally applicable to Title VII 
cases. Thus, although the ADEA does not contain “motivating factor” 
language akin to that found in the 1991 Act, the Court could use its 
Desert Palace reasoning to apply the conventional evidentiary rules of 
civil litigation to ADEA cases. 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of Gross’s Case 
There are three strengths of Gross’s case. First, Title VII and the 
ADEA are similar in both text and purpose.83 In Smith v. City of 
Jackson, the Supreme Court stated that to determine whether the 
ADEA allowed disparate impact claims, “we begin with the premise 
that when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having 
similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the 
other, it is appropriate to presume that Congress intended that text to 
have the same meaning in both statutes.”84 In that case, the Court 
noted that it had “consistently applied that presumption to language 
in the ADEA that was ‘derived in haec verba from Title VII.’”85 
Therefore, the kind of evidence required in order to obtain a mixed-
motive instruction in a Title VII case should apply equally to ADEA 
mixed-motive cases as it does to Title VII mixed-motive cases.  
 
 82. But see Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 934 n.25 (3rd Cir. 1997) (rejecting 
this argument). 
 83. See Strauch v. Am. Coll. of Surgeons, 301 F. Supp. 2d 839, 844 n.10 (N.D. Ill. 2004) 
(“Given the similarities in text and purpose between Title VII and [the] ADEA, . . . this Court 
considers it likely that whatever doctrinal changes emerge as a result of Desert Palace in the 
Title VII context will be found equally applicable in the ADEA arena. . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 84. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233 (2005). 
 85. Id. at 233–34 (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 584 (1978)). 
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Second, the plain language of the ADEA weighs against a direct 
evidence requirement. In Desert Palace, the Court stated that “[o]n its 
face, [Title VII] does not mention, much less require, that a plaintiff 
make a heightened showing through direct evidence.”86 The same 
argument can be made for the ADEA, which does not require a 
plaintiff to show direct evidence to obtain a mixed-motive jury 
instruction.  
Finally, there is no compelling reason to depart from the 
conventional rule of civil litigation in a non-Title VII case. As the 
Court in Price Waterhouse noted, “Exceptions to this standard are 
uncommon, and in fact are ordinarily recognized only when the 
government seeks to take unusual coercive action—action more 
dramatic than entering an award of money damages or other 
conventional relief—against an individual.”87 Because Congress has 
not indicated otherwise, an ADEA plaintiff should be able to prove 
her case using either circumstantial or direct evidence. 
The principal weakness of Gross’s case is that Justice O’Connor’s 
concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse appears to represent the 
Court’s most recent precedent on non-Title XII mixed-motive 
claims.88 Because the 1991 Act amended Title VII but did not 
explicitly amend the ADEA, there is a strong argument that Justice 
O’Connor’s direct evidence requirement controls outside of Title VII. 
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of FBL’s Case 
Assuming that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price 
Waterhouse establishes binding precedent, the principal strength of 
FBL’s case is that the 1991 Act amended Title VII but did not 
explicitly amend the other anti-discrimination statutes. A well-
established canon of statutory construction is that the starting point 
for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. The 
 
 86. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98–99 (2003). 
 87. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 253 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion). 
 88. It appears that Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion represents the narrowest 
rationale for the Court’s decision. While Justice Brennan stated that a plaintiff must show that 
an unlawful motive was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and Justice White noted 
that a plaintiff must prove that an unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the employment 
decision, Justice O’Connor required a plaintiff to prove by direct evidence that the unlawful 
motive was a substantial factor in the decision. Therefore, Justice O’Connor’s direct evidence 
requirement—the narrowest position taken by those Justices concurring in the judgment—
should represent the holding of the Court. City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 
U.S. 750, 764 n.9 (1988). 
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Court has held that “[a]bsent a clearly expressed legislative intention 
to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as 
conclusive.”89 In light of the plain language of the 1991 Act, FBL has a 
strong argument that the 1991 Act applies only to Title VII. A 
decision along these lines would promote the principle of separation 
of powers among the legislative and judicial branches of government 
because courts are reluctant to interfere with Congress’s chosen 
statutory language implemented pursuant to its lawmaking 
responsibilities. 
The principal weakness of FBL’s case is that there is no 
compelling reason to impose a heightened standard of proof in non-
Title VII mixed-motive cases. It seems odd to sacrifice consistency and 
uniformity in the law—contrary to the plain language of the statutes, 
congressional intent, and the conventional rule of civil litigation—
based on a fleeting reference to “direct evidence” in a concurring 
opinion of a splintered Supreme Court decision. 
VI.  DISPOSITION/CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court likely will reverse the holding of the Eighth 
Circuit and find that a plaintiff need not present direct evidence of 
discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motive instruction in a non-
Title VII discrimination case. Even if the Court finds that Justice 
O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins 
establishes binding precedent, the Court will likely hold that the 1991 
Act—with a legislative history that stressed consistency in 
interpreting the anti-discrimination statutes—as well as the reasoning 
in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa abrogated Justice O’Connor’s direct 
evidence rule. Absent some affirmative directive from Congress, the 
Court has never, and should never, limit a plaintiff to the presentation 
of direct evidence.90 Thus, applying a conventional rule of civil 
litigation, the Court will likely hold that a plaintiff can present either 
circumstantial or direct evidence in order to obtain a mixed-motive 
instruction in a non-Title VII discrimination case. 
 
 
 89. Consumer Product Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980). 
 90. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 100 (“It is not surprising, therefore, that neither 
petitioner nor its amici curiae can point to any other circumstance in which we have restricted a 
litigant to the presentation of direct evidence absent some affirmative directive in a statute.”). 
